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IDENTITY SYSTEMS / Agency Agents community

Enterprise identity and authorization designer

Plans enterprise identity flows, session revocation and tenant authorization with explicit failure-path tests.

“Expert identity engineer for OAuth 2.0/OIDC flows, enterprise SSO (SAML/OIDC) and SCIM provisioning, passkeys/WebAuthn, session architecture, and multi-tenant authorization with RBAC/ABAC.”

01 / THE REASONING

Why this made the selection.

  • The source consumes the login state before async exchange and explicitly requires atomic consumption in shared session stores.
  • Its RLS example uses transaction-local tenant context and a restricted application role, while enterprise coverage includes SCIM deprovisioning and break-glass recovery.
  • It limits browser login to authorization code with PKCE and requires every permission check on the server, with tenant id taken from the authenticated context rather than a request parameter.
  • The passkey sample stores signCount and says a decreasing count means a cloned credential, which is narrower than the WebAuthn recommendation's comparison rule.

02 / THE REVIEW RECORD

What we actually inspected.

Source review has boundaries.
A clear record is more useful than a “safe” badge.

Material inspected

  • engineering/engineering-identity-access-engineer.md (complete definition)
  • LICENSE (applicable redistribution terms)
  • Host custom-agent documentation; repository installation guidance where applicable

Our findings

  • The source consumes the login state before async exchange and explicitly requires atomic consumption in shared session stores.
  • Its RLS example uses transaction-local tenant context and a restricted application role, while enterprise coverage includes SCIM deprovisioning and break-glass recovery.
  • The rules forbid custom token formats and hand-rolled password hashes, and they say the client is never the authority for a permission check.
  • Tenant id comes from the authenticated context, not from request parameters, and JWTs are not to carry secrets.
  • The signCount comment treats a decrease as clone evidence. The fetched WebAuthn recommendation also describes a constant zero counter and other causes for a non-increasing count.

Not established by this review

  • No agent was installed or invoked. Host/model compatibility, task accuracy and runtime behaviour were not tested.
  • The resource was not executed and its tools were not called.

The review applies to the material and revision named here. A newer upstream release can change its behavior.

03 / PUT IT TO WORK

Use the role in your project.

Upstream setup instructions ↗
  1. Read the pinned definition and MIT licence; review the host permissions before use.
  2. Read the full definition as a role reference; create a host-valid .claude/agents/ working copy and bound tools to the agreed task.
  3. Provide tenant/account models, IdP protocols, trusted library versions, session storage and recovery requirements.

Before you start

  • A compatible agent host/model
  • Project inputs and separately installed/authorized toolchains or services

04 / FOLLOW THE EVIDENCE

The source trail.

Our notes are separate from the original resource.
Check upstream before adopting a new version.

  1. https://github.com/msitarzewski/agency-agents/blob/bd956db032d907387e6b9ddebff3e18f1de8c679/engineering/engineering-identity-access-engineer.md

    Supports: Workflow, inputs and outputs, Declared tools and constraints, Selection and limitations

  2. https://github.com/msitarzewski/agency-agents/blob/bd956db032d907387e6b9ddebff3e18f1de8c679/LICENSE

    Supports: Licence and attribution requirements

  3. https://code.claude.com/docs/en/sub-agents.md

    Supports: Host setup and permission defaults

  4. https://www.w3.org/TR/2026/REC-webauthn-3-20260825/#sctn-sign-counter

    Supports: Counter signals and non-cloning alternatives

Evidence & Ask